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SUBJECT Principles of Malenkov's Foreign Policy

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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

1. There is no change in the principal aims of Soviet foreign policy, as outlined at the Nineteenth Party Congress, and by Stalin. The new Soviet rulers are expansionists, but they wish to avoid a general war. Their main method is to undermine the West. Such changes in Malenkov's foreign policy as can be observed are tactical, and Stalin's rough methods are being replaced by more civil ones.
2. Coexistence with the Soviets is only possible on the basis of a balance of forces. The new Soviet rulers do not sincerely believe in coexistence. They are aware that the Western world understands the falsity of their coexistence proposals. Loyal coexistence is impossible because the Soviets do not want it; "false coexistence" is impossible because the west, particularly America, will not stand for it. Therefore, the only form of coexistence which is possible is the one based on a balance of forces.
3. The main aim of Soviet foreign policy is to break up Western unity. New Communist tactics are now in the making:
  - a. The Soviets want to discuss and eventually agree on European problems with Britain and France only, as "Europeans among themselves" (excluding the US).

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## Soviet Russia

- b. The Soviets want to discuss Asiatic problems with the Asiatics (excluding the US, and also Britain and France) as "Asiatics among themselves."
  - c. The Soviets are determined to bring about a Five Power Conference, because there they would be backed by the Chinese, against the Americans, and they hope to use the British and the French in their own game.
  - d. The Soviets are not interested in solving the problems under discussion with the West, they use these problems so as to create maximum dissension among the Westerners. For instance, the partition of Germany suits them and they know by now that they have nothing to gain by reuniting Germany. But they exploit this problem for stirring up trouble between the US, Britain and France.
4. The Soviets place no confidence in any "paper agreement" or "paper guarantee" of peace. The only guarantee which means anything to them is the balance of forces. At present they will not embark on any aggressive action outside the Soviet orbit, however loudly they may abuse the Western world. But they will react violently against any Western attempt to interfere within the Soviet orbit.
5. Malenkov and his group of "managers" seek to obtain an improvement in East-West relations, mainly for trade reasons, but also to gain time, which they feel works for them. Therefore they have decided to be more courteous than the old timers have been.
6. Soviet foreign policy is directed by Molotov, who by sheer habit is intransigent, and sets enormous emphasis on Soviet prestige. His relations with Malenkov are at present good.. Since Beria's removal there is a "detente" among the remaining Soviet leaders. For the time being they want to normalize relations with the West. But they differ as to the methods to be employed and the tactics to be used. Hence the "hesitations" which may be noted in Soviet foreign policy.
7. The army's increased influence is officially denied and is being carefully camouflaged.

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